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Judicial Limitation of Three-Judge
Court Jurisdiction
Congress enacted the Three-Judge Court Act' in 1910 to restrict
interference by federal courts with the operation of state statutes.
Refusing to withdraw all federal court power to enjoin the enforce-
ment of state legislation,2 Congress established procedures governing
the issuance of injunctions to protect state laws from "improvident
state-wide doom" at the hands of a single district judge.A Under the
Act, three judges, including one circuit judge, must hear and deter-
mine applications to enjoin enforcement of state statutes "upon the
ground of unconstitutionality."4 Their determination is appealable
directly to the Supreme Court.5
The requirement of a three-judge court was designed to reduce
the chance that a state statute would be invalidated by the caprice or
bias of a single judge. 6 The right of direct review was intended to
shorten the period of time during which an injunction erroneously
granted would remain in effect.i Originally the Three-Judge Court
1. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (current version at 28 U.S.c.
§§ 2281, 2284, 1253 (1970)). The Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), upholding an injunction issued by a
district judge against the enforcement of a Minnesota railroad rate statute. The au-
thoritative article on three-judge courts is Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 1 (1964). For a summary of the background
of and amendments to the Act, see P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 967-76 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as HART AND WECHSLER].
2. In 1908 Senator Lee S. Overman submitted a bill denying federal courts the power
to enjoin state statutes. In 1910 a similar bill was passed by the House but failed in the
Senate. Currie, supra note 1, at 6 & n.33, 7 & n.34 .
3. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). For the text of this section, see p. 568 infra.
In 1937 Congress extended the three judge-direct review procedure to constitutional
challenges to federal statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970):
[Alny party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying
. . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action . . . required
by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges.
6. See 45 CONG. REc. 7253 (1910) (remarks of Sen. Burton). The Supreme Court has
stated that assuring careful deliberation is an important purpose of the Act. Phillips v.
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 216 (1922).
7. See Currie, supra note I, at 7 & n.42, 8. Another rationale for the Act was a
desire to quiet public discontent with unpopular decisions: "If three judges declare
that a statute is unconstitutional the people would rest easy under it." 45 CoNr. Rrc.
7256 (1910) (remarks of Sen. Overman). See Note, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed,
72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1652-53 (1963).
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Act applied only to preliminary injunctions, by which a single district
judge, often after an ex parte hearing, could forestall the operation of
important state legislation for lengthy periods before resolution of the
merits.0 With little explanation, Congress subsequently extended the
Act to applications for permanent injunctions.9 As amended, it is now
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281 and 2284.
The Three-Judge Court Act has proven onerous.' 0 Empanelling
three judges disrupts the dockets of both district and circuit courts,"
especially since three-judge cases take precedence over all others.12 The
complexity of the Act leads to confusing searches for the proper forum,
delay, a waste of judicial resources, and added expense for litigants .1
3
Moreover, the right of direct review burdens the Supreme Court
with a growing compulsory docket at a time when its caseload al-
8. See Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REv. 795, 800-04 (1934).
For an argument that the particular evils of the ex parte interlocutory injunction that
gave rise to the Three-Judge Court Act have been eliminated, obviating the need for
the Act, see Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A
Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 555, 558-59 (1960). The Comment also ar-
gues that federal-state tensions have subsided. But see Note, The Three-Judge District
Court and Appellate Review, 49 VA. L. Rav. 538, 569 (1963), concluding that federal-
state relations are still "sufficiently delicate" to justify the three-judge court procedure
and citing as an example the friction caused by the reapportionment cases.
9. In 1925 Congress amended the Act to include applications for permanent injunc-
tions, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 938, in order to eliminate the "anom-
aly" of a single judge deciding the application for the permanent injunction after
three judges had decided the interlocutory request. Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 465
(1926); 66 CONG. REc. 291 (1924) (remarks of Sen. Cummins). The Supreme Court con-
strued the amendment to extend to permanent injunctions only when the plaintiff also
had applied for an interlocutory injunction. Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388 (1927). In
the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the Act was extended to any application for a
permanent injunction, whether or not an interlocutory injunction had been requested.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2281, 62 Stat. 936 (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)).
10. From 1964 to 1973, the number of cases for which three-judge courts were
convened increased from 119 to 320. Over 15 percent of those cases, however, were re-
views of ICC orders under a statute now repealed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2324, 2325 (1970),
iepealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917. Moreover, the rate of
annual increase of three-judge cases has slowed since 1971. See ANNUAL REPORT, AD-
MINISTLhrIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 151 (1973) (table).
11. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1941); H.R. REP. No. 93-1569,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1974) (comments of Chief Judge Harry Phillips, Sixth Circuit, and
Judge J. Skelly Wright, D.C. Circuit); Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They
Run.!, 52 F.R.D. 293, 293-94, 304-06 (1971).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(4) (1970).
13. "Unhappily, the [three-judge court] scheme is far from simple in its operation."
9 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE f 110.03[3], at 69 (2d ed. 1975). For an analysis of the
"bewildering problems" in the area of appellate review, see id. at 70-85. The rules
governing appellate review of decisions on whether a special court is required are "so
complex as to be virtually beyond belief." AMERICAN LAw INsTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVIsiON OF THE JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 332 (1969) [herein-
after cited as ALI STUDY]. The three-judge court procedures so perplexed one "helpless
litigant" that he traveled to eight separate forums in his search for relief. S. REP. No.
94-204, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1975).
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ready strains its capacity. 14 The Court increasingly disposes of these
three-judge cases in summary proceedings, without argument or writ-
ten opinion.'5 Hence many three-judge court decisions do not re-
ceive full review by any higher court. In response to arguments that
the three-judge court statutes are unduly burdensome and confusing,
the Senate twice has passed a bill that eliminates the three-judge
court and direct review procedures for most constitutional challenges
to state and federal legislation.6 The House of Representatives cur-
rently is considering a similar bill.17
This Note proposes a construction of the provisions of the Judicial
Code relating to three-judge courts and declaratory judgments' s which
would greatly reduce the need for congressional action by alleviating
many of the present difficulties of the three-judge court requirement.
The proposed construction builds on the evolving interpretation of
the Three-Judge Court Act and reflects the full import of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act of 1934.19
I. The Use of the Declaratory Judgment to
Curtail the Need for Three-Judge Courts
The Three-Judge Court Act neither compels nor encourages the
grant of injunctions. On the contrary, the cumbersome procedure set
up by the Act evinces congressional wariness of the power to enjoin
14. See Symposium, The Freund Report: A Statistical Analysis and Critique, 27 RuT.
L. REv. 878, 897-99, 902 (1974); REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 30 (1972); Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A.J.
1049, 1053 (1972); AV. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary (Feb. 16,
1976), reprinted in 96 S. Ct. 4, 5 (1976) (front pages). See geneially Hart, Foreword: The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
15. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974)
(nearly three-fourths of the appeals from three-judge courts are disposed of in summary
proceedings).
16. On September 25, 1975, the Senate passed S. 537, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1975),
which preserves the three-judge court "when otherwise required by Act of Congress or
when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of con-
gressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body." S. 537 § 3.
See S. REP. No. 94-204, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1975) (purpose of S. 537 is to reduce
burden on the federal judiciary and to eliminate confusion for litigants).
17. The House bill, H.R. 6150, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1, 2 (1975), preserves three-
judge courts for apportionment cases, as does the Senate bill, but it also requires the
special panel to convene for actions challenging the enforcement of state or federal
statutes when "such action is based on specific allegations that such statute . . . is un-
constitutional in that it discriminates against the plaintiff because of his race." Id. § 2.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970). Section 2202 provides: "[A]ny court of the United
States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration .... ." The declaratory judgment differs from an injunction
in that it is not accompanied by the threat of a contempt sanction. See 0. Fiss, IN-
JuxcTioNs 51 (1972) (injunction is "a declaratory judgment plus a coercive order").
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970).
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the enforcement of state statutes. Twenty-four years after it passed
the Three-Judge Court Act, Congress enacted the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act to create an alternative to the injunction. As a simple dec-
laration of rights unaccompanied by an immediate threat of contempt,
the declaratory judgment is milder than the injunction and is there-
fore better suited to the invalidation of unconstitutional state statutes
by federal courts.20 Because the declaratory judgment will often be
a fully adequate remedy, the Declaratory Judgment and Three-Judge
Court Acts together should be construed as urging federal courts to
dismiss an application for a permanent injunction without reaching
the constitutional grounds on which the state statute is challenged,
and to consider instead whether a declaratory judgment should be
granted. Such a disposition, if within the power of a single district
judge, would curtail sharply the need for three-judge courts. The spe-
cial procedures set forth in the Three-Judge Court Act would be
needed only in considering requests for preliminary injunctions, the
cases to which the Act originally applied.2 1
Pending issuance of a declaratory judgment, the federal courts must
continue to consider requests for preliminary injunctions. In this sit-
uation, the requirement of a three-judge court comports more fully
with the statutory purpose; the danger of bias and poor judgment-
the threat of "improvident doom" to state legislation-is more severe,
because a request for preliminary relief must be decided before a full
hearing on the merits.
This proposal would eliminate the need for a three-judge court in
any action in which a preliminary injunction is not requested. Where
a preliminary injunction is requested, the procedures suggested here
still would reduce substantially the drain on judicial resources. Sup-
pose, for example, a plaintiff challenges a state statute on constitu-
tional grounds, asking for preliminary and permanent injunctions and
a declaratory judgment. 22 The application for a preliminary injunc-
tion triggers the three-judge court requirement-a district judge and
a circuit judge join the one to whom the application was made. Sitting
20. See pp. 578-81 infra.
21. Fourteen years after the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress
extended the Three-Judge Court Act to cover the issuance of permanent injunctions.
See note 9 supra. This amendment reflected a congressional recognition that federal
courts were continuing to grant permanent injunctions against unconstitutional state
statutes despite the availability of the declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy.
But congressional recognition of this practice can in no way be considered an endorse-
ment of it. To the contrary, by requiring the safeguards of the Three-Judge Court
Act, Congress indicated its reservations about the use of the permanent injunction to
invalidate state legislation.
22. When the plaintiff seeks permanent injunctive relief but not a declaratory judg-
ment, the district court should dismiss with lease to file an amended complaint re-
questing declaratory relief. See FEr. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
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together, they determine whether or not to grant preliminary relief;
their determination can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
To this extent, current practice is unchanged.
What is changed, however, is the practice of reconvening the three-
judge court to rule on the request for permanent relief after it has
disposed of the request for preliminary relief. Under the proposal
of this Note, the single judge would dismiss the request for a perma-
nent injunction and proceed to decide whether a declaratory judg-
ment should be granted, with appeal from that decision to the court
of appeals. As a result, two of the three judges would not have to
participate in the full trial on the merits.
2 3
Part II of this Note addresses the question whether the Three-
Judge Court Act deprives the single judge of the power to follow
these procedures. After concluding that the single judge has that
power, the Note argues in Part III that the procedures are fully
consistent with the principles of equity and comity which govern
constitutional challenges to state statutes in the federal courts.
II. Jurisdictional Limitations on the Single Judge:
Issue Divisibility
The Supreme Court long has construed the Three-Judge Court
Act to transfer to the specially-constituted court a broader jurisdic-
tion than the Act actually conveys. On its face, § 2281 of the Judicial
Code does no more than redistribute the power to grant injunctions
on constitutional grounds:
[An] injunction restraining the enforcement . . . of any state
statute . . . shall not be granted . . . upon the ground of the
unconstitutionality of such statute unless . . . heard and deter-
mined by a district court of three judges ....
Reading the language of the statute literally, a single judge would
have power to hear and deny an application for an injunction on
constitutional grounds. Yet early cases imported the word "denied"
into § 2281, presumably to avoid the possibility that a three-judge
court would have to reconsider the merits whenever a single judge
decided not to deny the injunction.24 Initially, the Supreme Court
23. A three-judge court convened to hear an application for a preliminary injunction
may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing on preliminary
relief, thus allowing the court to dispose of the requests for a permanent injunction and
a declaratory judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). However, the three-judge court
is unlikely to advance and consolidate if the trial on the merits would impose a sub-
stantial burden on it.
24. Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911). See Currie, supra note 1,
at 20-21.
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construed the Act even more broadly to transfer jurisdiction over
the whole case whenever the plaintiff requested an injunction against
a state statute.
25
The burden on the federal judiciary imposed by the Act, however,
led the Court slowly to narrow its construction. 26 In recent years the
enormous increase in the caseload of federal courts has reinforced
the desire to reduce this burden.27 Analysis of recent cases inter-
preting the Act28 shows that requests for injunctive and declaratory
relief on the same constitutional grounds can be divided between
single-judge and three-judge courts, allowing the single judge to grant
declaratory relief without convening a three-judge court.2 9
25. See, e.g., Ex parte Madden Bros., 283 U.S. 807 (1931) (mandamus granted to
compel formation of three-judge court where single judge had dismissed for want of
jurisdiction). Not until Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31-32 (1933), was it clearly estab-
lished that a single judge even had the power to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Note,
28 MINN. L. REV. 131 & n.4 (1943) ("on principle" it would seem that prior to 1933 a
single judge could not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
26. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1965) (oerruling Kesler
v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962)); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250-51
(1941) (Congress was "mindful that the requirement of three judges . . . entails a serious
drain upon the federal judicial system"; § 2281 is not "a measure of broad social policy
to be construed with great liberality, but . . . an enactment technical in the strict sense
of the term and to be applied as such.") The Court justified its narrow construction
of § 2281 by its duty to honor a countervailing purpose of Congress to "keep within
narrow confines our appellate docket," expressed in the Judiciary Act of 1925. Id. at
250. For discussion of the purpose of the 1925 Act, see Taft, The Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court Under the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1 (1925); F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 119, 255-94 (1928).
27. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 9, 25-30
(1972); IV. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary (Feb. 16, 1976), reprinted
in 96 S. Ct. 4, 5 (1976) (front pages).
28. While this Note focuses on § 2281, it draws upon cases construing § 2282, which
requires the three judge-direct review procedure for constitutional challenges to acts of
Congress. Section 2282 was modeled on § 2281, and the direct review provision of both
sections is incorporated in § 1253. Their policies are parallel: § 2282 was designed to
mitigate tensions between two branches of the federal government, and § 2281 to mitigate
tensions between federal and state governments. While today friction between federal
and state governments is more serious than that between the legislative and judicial
branches of the federal government, see ALI STUDY, supra note 13, at 325, courts
generally apply the same standards under the two sections for requiring three judges
or permitting direct review. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154 (1963)
(relying on a § 2281 case for a § 2282 holding); Gunn v. University Comm. to End
the War in Vietnam, 399 U.S. 383, 387 (1970) (relying on § 2281 and § 2282 cases in
dismissing an appeal from a decision under § 2281l. The construction proposed here
for § 2281 is thus appropriate for § 2282. Furthermore, the declaratory judgment is a
preferred remedy for invalidating federal as well as state statutes. Cf. pp. 578-81 infra.
29. When only declaratory relief is requested, a three-judge court is not required,
since a declaratory judgment is not an "injunction" within the meaning of the three-
judge court statutes. See Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 430 (1970) ("While there
are similarities between injunctions and declaratory judgments, there are also impor-
tant differences."); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154 (1963) (constru-
ing § 2282). But see Currie, supra note 1, at 14-20 (arguing that a declaratory judg-
ment should be considered an injunction within the meaning of the three-judge court
statutes); Developments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments, 65 HARV. L. REv. 787, 869-70
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In limiting the jurisdiction of three-judge courts, the Court began
by narrowly defining the class of cases to which the Act applies.
For example, the Court has held that the Act does not apply when
the statute is challenged under a state constitution. 30 Nor does it apply
when the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a municipal or-
dinance,31 or of a state statute having only local effect.32 Similarly,
a state law alleged to be in conflict with a federal law and challenged
under the supremacy clause need not be reviewed by a three-judge
panel, since the interpretation of the statutes, not the Constitution,
is the basic issue in the case. 3
In addition to narrowing the class of cases over which the three-
judge court has jurisdiction, the Court has divided cases into "single-
judge" and "three-judge" issues, and has progressively reduced the
latter category. 4 This division avoids the need for a three-judge court
when resolution of a "single-judge" issue disposes of the case. Even
if the resolution of that issue is not dispositive, the work of the spe-
cial court is reduced.35
(1949). Testifying in favor of the creation of a federal declaratory judgment remedy,
Professor Edwin Borchard proposed that the bill be amended to require a three-judge
court for a declaratory judgment as well as for an injunction against a state statute.
Professor Edson Sunderland argued that a three-judge court should not be required to
grant a declaratory judgment. Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subconon. of the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1928). The amendment suggested by
Borchard was not incorporated in the Declaratory Judgment Act, as subsequently en-
acted by Congress in 1934.
30. Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 465 (1926); Ex parte Williams, 277 U.S. 267, 271
(1928).
31. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 101 (1967).
32. Id.; Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567-68 (1928). See HART AND WECIISLER, Supra
note 1, at 970-72.
33. Swift &: Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120-21, 128 (1965) ("The basic question
involved in these cases, however, is never one of interpretation of the Constitution but
inevitably one of comparing two statutes.")
34. Although in 1942 Congress limited the powers of a single judge, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5)
(1970), the Court has found those limitations to apply only after three judges properly
have been convened. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962).
35. A single judge has no power to decide a three-judge issue, but a three-judge
court may decide single-judge issues. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1974)
(§ 2281 permits but does not require statutory claim to be heard by single judge); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 230 F. Supp. 398, 410 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S.
111 (1965) (discussing possible rationales for allowing an improperly convened three-
judge court to act as a single judge); 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcrICE T 110.03[31, at 80
n.50 (2d ed. 1975) ("The implication would seem to be that if the three-judge court
considers the nonconstitutional claim and grants injunctive relief on the basis of it, it
is simply doing the work of a single judge. , discussing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970)).
The three-judge court has no authority to review single-judge issues already decided
except to determine whether the special panel has been properly convened. It is not a
"truncated court of appeals." Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 420 U.S. 999 (1975). See Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 926 (1975); Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d
1066, 1069 (3d Cir. 1974).
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The first step was to allow a single judge to decide only pre-
liminary issues such as justiciability or the existence of a substantial
federal question.-0 The three-judge court retained responsibility for
the merits of the case. That responsibility formerly extended to statu-
tory claims joined with a constitutional claim,:1? but recently the Court
has allowed division of the merits between single-judge and three-
judge courts.3
In Hagans v. Lavine,"0 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality
of a New York welfare regulation. A single judge avoided a substan-
tial constitutional claim, enjoining enforcement of the regulation on
the basis of an accompanying statutory claim. 40 On review, the Su-
preme Court approved, stating that the single judge's action "ac-
curately reflects ...this Court's concern for the efficient operation
of the lower federal courts. ' 4 1 Hagans holds that a single judge can
decide a statutory claim joined with a constitutional claim without
convening a three-judge court.42 The Court thus recognized that the
Three-Judge Court Act transferred only a narrow segment of the
power of the single judge to the special panel.
36. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31-32 (1933) (single judge may dismiss an action
for want of a substantial federal question); Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit
Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100 (1974) (justiciability a single-judge issue, citing Poresky).
37. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960) (state
statute challenged under equal protection and commerce clauses of the Constitution and
under the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937). Both the majority
and the dissent assumed that statutory and constitutional claims could not be divided
between two courts. The majority held that the three-judge court must decide all
claims. The dissenters argued that the single judge first should consider the statutory
claim in order to avoid the constitutional claim; if his resolution was not dispositive,
the single judge would have to proceed to the constitutional claim. Id. at 84-85, 91.
38. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1974). See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 403 (1970) ("[T]he most appropriate course may well have been [for the three-judge
court] to remand to the single district judge for findings and the determination of the
statutory claim [accompanying a constitutional claim].") (dictum).
39. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
40. Id. at 532-33.
41. Id. at 544, citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
42. In Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1974), a divided panel held
that a single judge cannot deny a statutory claim, and distinguished Hagans on the
ground that the single judge there had granted the statutory claim. The Murrow cdurt
considered it improper for the single judge, by denying the statutory claims, to deprive
the three-judge court of the opportunity to avoid the constitutional issue. But in Hagans,
415 U.S. at 544-45, the Supreme Court had cited Norton v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 596,
598-99 (D. Md. 1972), which rejected the position of the Murrow majority. For criticism
of Murrow, see 88 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1975); Note, Suits to Enjoin State Statutes On
Constitutional And Federal Preemption Grounds: Allocation of Jurisdiction Between
The Single District Judge And The Three-Judge Court, 64 GEo. L.J. 113, 118-22
(1975). For evidence that the Hagans procedure of dividing statutory and constitutional
issues between single-judge and three-judge courts may impose a greater burden on both
judiciary and litigants than leaving both issues to the three-judge court, see id. at 120-22.
For problems of appeal posed by the Hagans division, see id. at 123-26; 88 HARV. L. REV.
1028, 1030-31 (1975).
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MTM, Inc. v. Baxley45 further reduced the category of three-judge
issues. Under Alabama nuisance law, a state court preliminarily en-
joined the operation of plaintiff's Pussycat Adult Theater. With the
action for a permanent injunction pending in a state court, the plain-
tiff sued in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the preliminary
injunction, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. A three-
judge court dismissed the complaint without resolving the constitu-
tional merits, on the ground that the pending proceedings made
federal intervention inappropriate. 4 The plaintiff appealed directly
to the Supreme Court under § 1253. The Court denied review, hold-
ing that the three-judge court's dismissal did not constitute a denial
of injunctive relief within the meaning of that section. It construed
§ 1253 to provide direct appeal from a denial of injunctive relief
only where the denial "rests upon the resolution of the merits of
the constitutional claim presented below," and concluded that a dis-
missal on the ground of impropriety of federal intervention was not
such a denial.
45
The MTM Court refused to decide whether a single judge had the
power to dismiss on this ground .4  However, to deny direct review
of such a decision and still to require the decision to be made by
a three-judge court would, as Justice White asserted in his concur-
rence, "manhandl[e] the language" of § 1253. 47 That section allows
an appeal to the Supreme Court from "any order granting or denying"
an injunction in any civil action "required . . . to be determined by
... three judges." If no direct appeal lies from an order in an action
required to be heard by three judges, the disposition must not have
been "an order granting or denying" an injunction. But § 2281 re-
quires three judges only for injunctions "granted" by any district
court. Hence the possibility left open by the MTM Court could arise
only if, in an Act originally passed as one section,41 the "grant" of
an injunction (under § 2281) were somehow construed to reach a
broader range of denials than the "grant or denial" of an injunction
(under § 1253).49 Moreover, as Justice White pointed out, to require
43. 420 U.S. 799 (1975).
44. Id. at 800.
45. Id. at 804.
46. Id. at 802 n.7.
47. Id. at 805.
48. The Three-Judge Court Act was enacted as one section (§ 17) of the Act of
June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539.
49. The Court has construed § 2281 to require three judges to deny as well as to grant
injunctions on the ground of unconstitutionality. See pp. 568-69 supra. Accepting
the established rule that both sections apply to orders granting or denying injunctions,
construing the implied "denial" of § 2281 more broadly than the express "denial" of
§ 1253 still is not justified. In deciding whether to permit a direct appeal, the Supreme
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both a decision by three judges in the district court and an appeal
to another panel of three judges in the court of appeals would be
"an exorbitant waste of judicial manpower."5 0
Thus, if § 1253 is construed to prevent direct review of a deci-
sion that an injunction against enforcement of a state statute would
be inappropriate, § 2281 should be construed to permit a single judge
to make that disposition.5 1 After MTM, the only issues left for de-
cision by the three-judge court should be the constitutional merits.
5 2
The Court stretched the concept of issue divisibility to the limit
in Steffel v. Thompson.53 State officers had threatened to charge the
plaintiff with criminal trespass if he continued to distribute antiwar
handbills in a shopping center. A single judge denied both declara-
tory and injunctive relief in the ensuing constitutional challenge
Court long has implicitly equated § 2281's "grant" and § 1253's "granting or denying"
by focusing on § 1253's requirement that the injunction be granted or denied in an
action "required by an Act of Congress to be determined by . . . three judges." Gonzalez
v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 95 n.12, 96 n.14 (1974). But see
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 712 n.8 (1975) (decision of three-judge court on
statutory grounds was appealable directly to the Supreme Court, even though single
judge could have resolved the statutory claim, which was not raised until oral argument
before three-judge court).
50. 420 U.S. at 806.
51. MTM undermines the authority of Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S.
713 (1962), which held that § 2281 requires three judges for a decision to abstain "in
order to give the state courts an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues
presented .. " Concurring in MTM, Justice White urged that Idlewild be overruled:
"[c]ases like Idlewild are derelicts and should be expressly cleared from the scene." 420
U.S. at 807 (footnote omitted). In explicitly avoiding the implications of its decision for
§ 2281, the Court did not mention Idlewild, even though Justice White's concurrence
and Justice Douglas's dissent questioned its continuing authority. Id. at 802 n.7, 805-06
& n.1, 809.
In a recent decision the Second Circuit ostensibly respected the Idlewild rule that
abstention requires three judges, but it seemed to recognize the post-MTM weakness
of that authority. McRedmond v. Wilson, No. 75-7389, slip op. at 1752 (2d Cir., Feb. 2,
1976). The court circumvented Idlewild by attributing to the single judge, who had
abstained, a sub silentio ruling that the constitutional question was insubstantial. Without
the sub silentio attribution, Idlewild would have required the court of appeals to find
the single judge's decision void for want of jurisdiction.
52. The three-judge court in MTM dismissed the request for an injunction against
pending state criminal proceedings under the rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). 420 U.S. at 801-02. The procedure suggested in this Note-that the single
judge dismiss requests for permanent injunctions in favor of declaratory judgments-is
rooted in the same underlying principles as the Younger rule. See pp. 576-77 &
nn.68-69 infra.
Since MTM implies that the single judge may dismiss under Younger, a fortiori he
may dismiss under the proposed rule. Before MTM the rationale for requiring three
judges for a Younger dismissal had been that "an exercise of discretion will usually be
necessary." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 457 n.7 (1974) (Brennan, J.). But see
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 44 U.S.L.W. 4372, 4376 n.22
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1976) ("no discretion to grant injunctive relief" where case is properly
within Younger) (Brennan, J.). Under the rule proposed here, the district judge would,
as a matter of course, dismiss the request for a permanent injunction; an exercise of
discretion would be unnecessary.
53. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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of the trespass statute; the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of de-
claratory relief.5 4
The Supreme Court stated that a three-judge court should have
been convened below.- If indeed a three-judge court were required,
the single judge would have lacked power to decide the case, and his
decision would have been void for want of subject matter jurisdiction;
the court of appeals also would have lacked jurisdiction and would
have had to remand for the convening of a three-judge court.50 Yet
the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the court of appeals-
and thus necessarily that of the district court.5 7
The Court's assertion that a three-judge court should have been
convened cannot be reconciled with its disposition of the case unless
a single judge has power to grant or deny a declaratory judgment
even when the plaintiff also requests injunctive relief on the same
constitutional grounds.55 The Supreme Court could have found juris-
diction below only by interpreting § 2281 as dividing the power to
decide requests for declaratory and injunctive relief between single-
judge and three-judge courts. Steffel necessarily implies that the Three-
Judge Court Act transfers nothing more than the power to grant or
deny the injunctive remedy in a constitutional challenge to a state
statute. The single judge always retains the power to grant a de-
claratory judgment.5 9
54. Id. at 456-57. Petitioner appealed the denial of both injunctive and declaratory
relief. However, the Court found that he "abandoned" the appeal from the denial of
the injunction in his brief in the court of appeals. Id. at 456 n.6.
55. Id. at 457 n.7: "Since the complaint had originally sought to enjoin enforcement
of the state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality, a three-judge district court should
have been convened."
56. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-55 (1963) (construing § 2282)
(dictum); Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 716 (1962); Borden Co. v.
Lilly, 309 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963) (the court of appeals
first raised the question of jurisdiction and found that it had to remand for trial
before a three-judge court); Currie, supra note 1, at pp.76-77.
57. 415 U.S. at 457 n.7: "But since petitioner's request for injunctive relief was
abandoned on appeal . . . and only a request for declaratory relief remained, the
Court of Appeals did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the appeal." The Court
went on to hold that the district court and the court of appeals erred in denying
went on to hold that the district court and the court of appeals erred in relying on
the same considerations to deny declaratory relief as they did to deny injunctive relief.
58. To support its finding of jurisdiction, the Court cited four cases in which a
three-judge court had made the disposition below. Id. These cases were utterly inapposite
to Steffel, in which the Court was reviewing the decision rendered by a single judge.
59. The district court in Steffel denied declaratory relief as inappropriate under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga.
1971), rev'd sub nor., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Hence neither the court
of appeals nor the Supreme Court reached the underlying question of the constitu-
tionality of the state criminal statute. The narrowest interpretation of the Court's holding
in Steffel is simply that a single judge has power to deny declaratory relief on Younger
grounds. But a logical implication of that holding is that a single judge has power to
reach the underlying constitutional merits in order to grant or deny a declaratory judg-
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The Second Circuit recently embraced the logic of Steffel in Stone
v. Philbrook.°0 Plaintiff asked for declaratory and permanent injunc-
tive relief against enforcement of a Vermont welfare regulation. 1 A
single judge granted declaratory relief, but ignored the request for
the injunction. 2 On appeal, the state challenged the jurisdiction of
the single judge and hence of the court of appeals. 3 Relying on Steffel,
the court of appeals found jurisdiction:
[I]t would seem to follow a fortiori [from Steffel] that the court
of appeals has jurisdiction when a single judge has only taken
action he could properly take, even though he was asked to take
action he could not properly take and made no disposition of
the request to do more.0 4
Philbrook thus held that the single judge has power to grant de-
claratory relief when he fails to act on an additional claim for an in-
junction based on the same constitutional ground.
Writing for the panel, Judge Friendly expressed dismay at the
"new puzzlement" created by Steffel and MTM in the "never-never
land" of three-judge courts. 5 Yet as analyzed here these cases dispel
ment since, when the Court decided Steffel, a dismissal under Younger was considered a
denial on the merits for purposes of § 2281. "A three-judge court . .. is normally re-
quired even if the decision is to dismiss under Younger-Samuels principles .... ."
415 U.S. at 457 n.7. (The Court's decision a year later in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S.
799 (1975), may be read to authorize a single judge to dismiss under Younger. See
p. 572 supra).
60. 528 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1975).
61. In his complaint, Stone asked for a declaratory judgment, a temporary restraining
order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction. The temporary restraining
order had been granted before Stone moved for summary judgment. Id. at 1086. Since
Stone had already obtained preliminary relief, only the requests for a permanent in-
junction and a declaratory judgment were before the court in the hearing on his
motion for summary judgment.
The court should have convened a three-judge court to review the grant of the tem-
porary restraining order. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(3). However, that order was not before the
court of appeals.
62. 528 F.2d at 1089-90 (district court failed to act on the request for an injunction);
see id. at 1087-88 (court of appeals quotes district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, declaring state policy unconstitutional but making no disposition
of the request for injunctive relief).
63. Id. at 1088-89. After the entry of the district court's declaratory order, the de-
fendant moved to vacate the order for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that a three-judge
court should have been convened under § 2281. Id. at 1088. On appeal, the defendant
asked the court to reverse and remand for the convening of three judges.
64. Id. at 1089 (emphasis added). After finding that it had jurisdiction to review
the decision of the single judge, the circuit court went on to reach the merits of the
grant of declaratory relief. It vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded
with specific instructions that the single judge retain jurisdiction pending resolution
of a state law question in the Vermont courts. Id. at 1094.
65. Judge Friendly started from the premise that "if either party had requested the
convening of a three-judge court, the request should have been granted." Id. at 1088.
He hinted that his finding of jurisdiction, which he realized was compelled by Steffel,
575
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much of the confusion surrounding the Three-Judge Court Act by
restricting its reach to the grant or denial of injunctive relief on the
constitutional merits. When a single judge is confronted with claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief against a state statute, Steffel
implies that he has jurisdiction to grant the declaratory judgment;
MTM implies that he can dismiss the request for the injunction so
long as he does not reach the constitutional merits.
The single judge in Philbrook therefore had the power to decide the
request for a declaratory judgment while failing to grant the request
for a permanent injunction.60 Part III of this Note argues that the
single judge should exercise that power and forthrightly dismiss a
request for a permanent injunction in light of fundamental prin-
ciples of equity and federalism. 6
7
III. The Declaratory Judgment as a Preferred Remedy
A basic principle of equity jurisprudence holds that a court should
not grant an injunction where the petitioner is not threatened with
irreparable harm. That doctrine assumes special importance in the
context of federal-state relations, because of the danger that an in-
junction will "unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
could be explained on a theory that the state had waived the right to a three-judge
court by "belatedly" requesting it after the single judge had granted summary judgment
for the plaintiff. Id. at 1088, 1090. This waiver theory, however, ignores the jurisdic-
tional nature of § 2281. That section redistributes judicial power; where a single judge
lacks power to decide an issue, he must convene a three-judge court, whether or not
a litigant requests it. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 153 (1963) (decided
under § 2282); Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 18 (1930); Ex parte Metropolitan
Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1911); ALl SruD', supra note 13, at 331; Currie, supra
note 1, at 76-77; Currie, Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or Not to Empanel
a Three-Judge Federal Court, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 159, 159 (1969); Note, supra note 42,
at 114 n.3 (1975).
66. Although not before the court of appeals in Philbrook, 528 F.2d at 1089-90, the
failure of the district judge to act on the request for an injunction was clearly im-
proper. This Note proposes that, rather than simply ignore such a request, a single
judge should dismiss it on the ground that federal injunctive relief is inappropriate.
67. The only other alternative to the traditional practice of treating requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief as indivisible is to allow the plaintiff to seek the two
forms of relief in separate courts. For judicial discussion of such an attempt, see Spencer
v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839, 840 (3d Cir. 1972); id. at 847:
[It is theoretically possible for a challenge to the constitutionality of state statutes
to proceed simultaneously along two routes at the district court level-before a single
judge by way of a request for declaratory relief and before a [three-judge] court
by way of the injunction route. It is also theoretically possible for different results
to emerge from the separate trial courts. ... It is [also] possible that two separate
appellate courts can simultaneously have before them identical issues . ..
Such an extravagant expenditure of judicial resources on the same issue for the benefit
of the same plaintiff is "particularly pernicious." Id. at 846.
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States." 605 When asked to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes, the
Supreme Court has shown great respect for these principles.69
Where the declaratory judgment is available as an alternative remedy
for the protection of constitutional rights, the denial of a permanent
injunction does not expose the plaintiff to any danger of irreparable
injury. The losing party nearly always heeds the declaration; 70 in the
rare case when he does not, the prevailing party can request a prelim-
inary injunction pending appeal or a permanent injunction after ap-
pellate review. 71 In either instance, collateral review of the constitu-
68. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (reversing a grant of an injunction
restraining a pending state criminal prosecution).
69. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 608 (1976) (reversing a grant of a mandatory
injunction ordering implementation of a comprehensive program to improve procedures
for handling citizen complaints of police misconduct) (alternative holding):
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing
the relationship between federal courts and state governments, though initially ex-
pounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in [attempts] to enjoin a crimi-
nal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situation or indeed
to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles likewise have applicability
where injunctive relief is sought not against the judicial branch of the state gov-
ernment, but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state
or local governments ....
For other examples, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (reversing a grant of an injunction against the
enforcement of a state railroad regulation to allow the issues of state law to be adjudicated
in a state forum) (citations omitted):
Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor
than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies, whether the policy relates
to the enforcement of the criminal law, or the administration of a specialized scheme
for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the final authority of a state
court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state. These cases reflect a doc-
trine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts,
"exercising a wise discretion," restrain their authority because of "scrupulous re-
gard for the rightful independence of the state governments" and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary.
See generally HART AND WECHSLER, supra note I, at 985-1050.
70. ALI STuD, supra note 13, at 323:
[Voluntary compliance with the orders of federal courts is the norm and the desid-
eratum and this is as true of declaratory judgments as of injunctive orders. A state
is not likely to seek to enforce a statute that has been solemnly declared uncon-
stitutional.
E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 12 (2d ed. 1941): "The display of force is quite
unnecessary to give effect to the [declaratory judgment]. The more highly organized
a society becomes, the less occasion there is to display force in order to secure obedience
to its decrees and adjudications." Id. at 439 (footnote omitted): "The declaration is an
authoritative adjudication and guide to conduct, and rarely, so far as records disclose,
has it become necessary again to invoke the aid of the court to carry a declaratory
judgment into forceful effect." See Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 433 (1970) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ("The declaratory judgment may well contain a 'thou shalt not' as
commanding as any injunction."); Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional
Change, 24 VAND. L. REv. 257, 260 (1971).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 empowers a federal court to grant "[flurther necessary or proper
relief based on a declaratory judgment." If the defendant refuses to act in accordance
with the declaration of rights after the declaration has been affirmed on appeal, an in-
The Yale Law Journal
tional issues is foreclosed,72 and a single judge may grant the relief
required to enforce the rights already declared. The substitution of de-
claratory for permanent injunctive relief does not put the plaintiff at
a significant disadvantage pending appeal. If declaratory relief is grant-
ed, the plaintiff may apply for an enforcing injunction, while if per-
manent injunctive relief is granted, the state may apply for a stay.
The court will consider the same factors in ruling on either request.
1 4
The declaratory judgment is not only an adequate substitute for
a permanent injunction; it is also fundamentally better suited to the
invalidation of unconstitutional state statutes. When a federal court
declares constitutional rights under a challenged statute, it does not,
in the first instance, command compliance with that declaration un-
der threat of contempt. If compliance with a declaration of unconsti-
tutionality would substantially disrupt state affairs or would intrude
in particularly sensitive areas, the state may choose not to recognize
it pending review by an appellate court. Only when the plaintiff ini-
tiates and prevails in an action for a preliminary injunction pending
appeal must the state recognize the declaration. Moreover, the plaintiff
carries the burden of persuasion in such an action, while if the court
grants a permanent injunction, the state bears the burden of obtaining
a stay of the injunction pending appeal.
Except for this shift in the burden of obtaining compliance with
the order pending appeal, the eventual legal effect on the states of
a declaratory judgment is identical to that of a permanent injunction.
junction becomes both "necessary" and "proper" under § 2202; without it the declaratory
judgment would be an unenforceable advisory opinion. Pending appeal, a court may
similarly find a temporary injunction necessary and proper.
72. The declaratory judgment would estop the defendant from relitigating the con.
stitutional issues in an ancillary proceeding to enforce that judgment. King v. United
States, 390 F.2d 894, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) ("Dec-
larations have, by [28 U.S.C. § 2201], 'the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree' and, therefore, collaterally estop the litigants from retrying issues.") (dictum).
But see Currie, supra note 1, at 18 n.102 (arguing for an exception to "the prevailing
federal rule that ordinarily a declaratory judgment is res judicata pending appeal").
73. It might be argued that an injunction to enforce a declaratory judgment affirmed
on appeal rests on the constitutional determination underlying the declaratory judgment,
and hence that the injunction is granted "upon the ground of the unconstitutionalit)"
of a state statute. Even if this argument is accepted, § 2281 does not require a three-
judge court to issue the enforcing injunction. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (197:1),
held that when "prior decisions inescapably render the [constitutional] claims frivolous,"
a three-judge court is not required. The declaratory judgment is a "prior decision"
which renders any constitutional claims frivolous in the subsequent hearing on the
injunction.
But see Currie, supra note 1, at 17-19 & n.102 (arguing that to allow a single
judge to grant an injunction in support of a declaratory judgment would undermine
the policy of the three-judge court statute).
74. Compare 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE r 62.05, at 24-26 (2d ed. 1975) (stay) with
id. ff 65.041l], at 39-47 (preliminary injunction).
Vol. 85: 564, 1976
Judicial Limitation of Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction
Nevertheless, the manner of intrusion by declaratory judgment is
preferable for review of state legislation. For a lower federal court
to declare constitutional rights and presume good-faith compliance
shows more respect for state sovereignty than to threaten state officers
with contempt sanctions before they have had an opportunity to
comply.
The legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act supports
the view of the declaratory judgment as a preferred alternative to
the injunction when state legislation is challenged on constitutional
gTounds. 75 Because the declaratory judgment "is not followed ...by
immediately coercive relief," Congress expected it to obviate "much
of the hostility to the extensive use of the injunction power by the
federal courts."76 The Senate Report noted that the declaratory judg-
ment had proved so "necessary" that "in many cases the injunction
procedure [had been] abused in order to render ... in effect a de-
claratory judgment." 77
In construing the three-judge court statutes, the Supreme Court has
relied on the less disruptive nature of declaratory relief.78 In Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court stated that the declaratory judgment
below affected the Government "in a totally noncoercive fashion."7 9
The Court reasoned that "[p]ending review in the Court of Appeals,
and in this Court, the Government has been free to continue to
apply the statute"; hence, unlike the situation where an injunction
has been issued, "the operation of the statutory scheme [was not] im-
mediately disrupted."80
More recently, in Steffel v. Thompson the Court recognized the
"less intrusive effect [of the declaratory judgment] on the adminis-
tration of state criminal laws." 81 The Court held unanimously that
75. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act, see
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (1971). Writing
for the Court in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-72 (1974), Justice Brennan
drew heavily on his Perez concurrence; he stated that
Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong
medicine of the injunction and to be utilized to test the constitutionality of state
criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief would be unavailable ...
Id. at 466.
76. S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 155 (1963) (§ 2282, the federal
counterpart to § 2281, does not bar single judge from hearing action for declaratory
relief where injunctive relief was not contemplated); see Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S.
427, 430-31 (1970) (finding a distinction between a declaratory judgment and an injunction
for purposes of allowing direct review of the determination of a three-judge court con-
vened under § 2282).
79. 372 U.S. 144, 155 (1963).
80. Id.
81. 415 U.S. 452, 469 (1974).
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even where an injunction against a threatened state criminal proceed-
ing would be inappropriate, federal declaratory relief was not pre-
cluded.s2 For an important category of constitutional challenges to
state statutes, then, the Court has elevated the declaratory judgment
to a preferred position over the injunction.
In earlier cases, courts simply have acted on this preference for the
declaratory judgment under the assumption that the state would
comply with a declaration of constitutional rights.8 " In Roe v. Wade,
for example, the Court found it "unnecessary to decide whether the
District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief, for we assume
the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence" to the
declaratory judgment.8 4 In Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent
School District, the three-judge court declared unconstitutional the
Texas system of financing public education, and enjoined the state
from giving effect to the state provisions on which the school fi-
nancing system was based; however, it stayed the injunction for two
years to give the state legislature an opportunity to comply with the
declaration.8 And in Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, the
three-judge court granted a declaratory judgment, but refused to issue
a mandatory injunction directing payments by state officers:
Plaintiffs' request for an injunction presents questions of the
effectiveness and necessity of that remedy . . . . [,] an extreme
82. Id. at 471-72. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), the Court held that a
three-judge court should have dismissed requests for a declaratory judgment against
a state criminal statute and for an injunction restraining the enforcement of the statute,
because a state prosecution under the statute was pending. The Court reasoned that
"ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with
and disruption of state proceedings" as an injunction, and hence that "with respect
to the limited question [on cases where the criminal proceeding was begun prior to
the civil suit, the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be judged by
essentially the same standards." Id. at 72. Steffel expressly reaffirmed that Sam uels is
limited to cases where a state criminal proceeding is pending. 415 U.S. at 460-61, 475.
83. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Thoms v. Smith, 334 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (D. Conn. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 418
U.S. 908 (1974) ("We have no reason to believe defendants will continue to enforce the
[statute] upon notice of this decision; accordingly, we forebear to enter an injunction
restraining them from enforcing it."); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.,
337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Catholic
Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S.
820, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 931 (1970); University Comm. to End the War in
Vietnam v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal dismnissed, 399 U.S.
383 (1970). In Gunn, a three-judge court granted declaratory and injunctive relief, but
ordered that the "mandate shall be stayed" pending the next session of the Texas
legislature. The three-judge court did not make clear whether it meant to stay the
declaratory judgment as well as the injunction, see 399 U.S. at 387, 389-90, but "the
opinion of the District Court should be viewed as having the operative effect of a
declaratory judgment invalidating the Texas statute. Id. at 391 (White, J., con-
curring).
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
85. 337 F. Supp. 280, 286 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
580
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exercise of federal judicial power. . . . [T]he court may assume
that [the state] will abide by a judicial declaration of rights
without having to be compelled to do so by injunction. Relief
by way of declaratory judgment should meet the situation ade-
quately. If further state action is unreasonably delayed, plaintiffs
may apply for supplemental injunctive relief. .... 6
Cases such as Roe, Rodriguez, and Catholic Medical Center, in which
declaratory relief was found adequate even though injunctive relief
was also requested, were decided by three-judge courts. Under the anal-
ysis of Part II of this Note, such cases could have been decided by a
single judge. The single judge may-and should-dispose of all issues
in a constitutional challenge to a state statute except the question of
preliminary injunctive relief. For the single judge to exercise this
power would promote "the smooth working of the federal judiciary"
8
and show deference to state sovereignty, without undermining the pro-
tection of constitutional rights.
86. 305 F. Supp. 1268, 1270-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 820, appeal dismissed,
400 U.S. 931 (1970).
87. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.).
